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What Do Unions Want?
When New York State’s Public Employee Unions Turned Down the Right to Strike
Marc Kagan, History Department, CUNY Graduate Center

Abstract: In a 1977 package of proposed revisions of New York State’s “Taylor Law,” which
governs public employee labor-management relations and prohibits work stoppages,
unions were offered the right to strike, while managers would have gained the right to
unilaterally change contract terms at expiration. In effect, this deal would have made state
labor relations more similar to bargaining in private industry. Offered an expanded ability
to strike, the municipal unions instead opted for defensive stability.

Nationwide, strikes are back in the repertoire of unions. Meanwhile a few New York
public employee unions have begun discussing amending the Taylor Law, which levies
heavy penalties for all work stoppages and slowdowns. So it is worth examining a pertinent
moment when the New York State government almost restored the right to strike.
In 1977, then-Governor Hugh Carey proposed a package of Taylor Law revisions
which offered virtually all unions relief from injunctions and fines, while employers would
have gained the right to unilaterally change contract terms at contract expiration. In effect,
this deal would have made state labor relations more similar to bargaining in private
industry. Offered an expanded ability to strike, the municipal unions instead opted for
defensive stability.
The story begins with efforts by state and municipal unions to win an “agency fee”
for their work in behalf of represented workers who were not members. While the
Supreme Court decision Janus v. AFSCME recently voided agency shop provisions, in 1977

the wind was blowing in the other direction, and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
upheld (but also narrowed1) a Michigan law giving such a right to unions.
In New York State, statute revision allowing agency fees followed the Abood ruling
by just months. That agency shop was now “legal” smoothed passage of a bill unions had
been seeking for many years. Agency shop was also a sort of quid pro quo for the unions’
wage and benefit concessions during the NYC fiscal crisis, which had begun two years
earlier.
Agency fees were thus incorporated into New York State’s “Taylor Law,” as its labor
relations statutes are generally known. Of course, what is most popularly known about the
Taylor Law is that it prohibits public employee strikes and other job actions. Workers can
be fined a day of pay for each day (or part of a day) off the job, along with the lost day of
pay for not working – hence the popular terminology of “two-for-one.” Unions also face
injunctions and then fines for non-compliance. They often have been stripped for some
period of time of the right to “dues check-off,” where the employer automatically deducts
member dues and agency fees from paychecks and forwards them to the union.2
For decades, various public employee unions have demanded restoration of the
legal right to engage in work stoppages, or (for it amounts to much the same thing) an
elimination of the various penalties. Yet a look back at those 1977 revisions reveals that
unions very likely had the opportunity then to regain the right to strike except in unusual
circumstances.

In Abood and subsequent cases revisiting Abood, the court limited agency fee to the costs of “non-political”
activities, such as grievance handling and collective bargaining. The centerpiece of Janus was the
determination that all public employee union activities are, a priori, political.
2 The full “Taylor Law” can be found at https://www.perb.ny.gov/taylor-law/ For this articles purposes, the
relevant portions are found in Section 210 Prohibition of Strikes.
1

The context to their decision is important. By the spring of 1977, the large New York
City unions had been through two tumultuous years. Rumors of fiscal problems and layoffs
began in spring 1975; that summer, unions agreed to defer the raises due them in 1974-76
contract agreements; mass layoffs began in the fall. By the time those layoffs reached their
apogee, the NYC public employee workforce had shrunk from 266,000 to 210,000. The
1976 contracts all imposed a wage freeze for two years (with small cost-of-living increases
entirely conditional on productivity gains), and cuts in health benefits.3 This was the
genesis of “pattern bargaining” in New York, where a wage and benefit costs set with one
union become the norm for all.
Three strikes against these early austerity measures were notable for their
ineffectiveness. During that first summer, after sanitation workers had shouted down their
long-time union leader John DeLury as he outlined concessions, the union nodded and
winked at a “wildcat” over initial layoffs. Those were hastily cancelled, but when a new
more draconian set of layoffs was initiated several months later, the workers emotional
energy to fight back was apparently spent.
That September, Albert Shanker briefly lost his fabled iron control over the United
Federation of Teachers. UFT was the only major city union with an expiring contract that
year. A tentative agreement was already unpopular. Then, layoffs of thousands of lowseniority teachers meant that when school opened thousands of others were transferred
into those jobs in largely minority and impoverished school districts, while class sizes
reached 40 and even 50 in some cases. A raucous Delegates meeting rejected the contract

The various cuts and concessions and the three brief strikes are discussed in Kim Phillips-Fein, Fear City
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2017) and Joshua Freeman, Working Class New York (New York: The New
Press, 2001).
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and sent teachers out on strike. When they returned to work a week later, they had won no
relief, but were a paycheck lighter – money the City had “saved.” To rub salt in the wound,
the newly created Emergency Financial Control Board initially rejected the contract
Shanker had finally gotten approved, demanding the freezing of all “steps”– the routinized
gradual increases in salary that reward the increased competence that comes with years of
teaching experience.
A third strike over layoffs, of DC37 health workers at the City’s municipal hospitals,
was even more calamitous. The strike was hastily called off after thousands of workers
crossed their union’s picket lines.
What is apparent across-the-board was the crisis the unions as institutions faced.
They were philosophically inclined to muddle through the crisis and hope for better days
ahead, rather than wage a challenging political-ideological fight; but layoffs meant
plummeting dues revenues, while concessions led to increasing unrest among their
remaining members. 4
Along with declining numbers of represented workers came an even more
precipitous drop in membership. One way for disgruntled workers to express their
resentment about concessions was to resign their membership. The savings – generally
around 1% of salary – were small, so for workers, this action was primarily symbolic; but
for the unions, the lost dues of thousands of former members added up quickly. Based on
statistics published in New York’s Civil Service newspaper, The Chief that year, I estimate
that approximately 30% of the represented workers of CSEA, the main state union, and 15-

Michael Spear, Crisis in Urban Liberalism, unpublished dissertation, 2005. Spear argues that, faced with a
Hobson’s choice, unions opted for layoffs over more wage concessions: laid-off workers were no longer angry
“members.”
4

20% of the workers represented by New York City’s largest union, DC37, were not
members. 5
In Albany, the unions argued that they had acted as good citizens, propping up the
city’s finances while the banks had dumped their municipal bonds and fled, and now they
needed the protection of the agency fee. If members were forced to pay effectively the same
rate to the union whether a member or not, leaders would be freed from member pressure
to take a more recalcitrant position against concessions.6 As the editor of The Chief stated
bluntly,
another benefit, to both labor and management, is that an agency shop
will help unions be more objective in dealing with employers and
better able to pursue a more responsible course of action. That is
particularly true during a financial crisis like the city has experienced
for the past three years. Unions, even with their own financial solvency
at stake agreed to no-raise contracts, wage increase deferrals and
fringe benefit givebacks so the city could avoid bankruptcy and meet its
payroll. The Beame administration’s support of the agency shop bill
was, in part, predicated on protecting the solvency of unions so they, in
turn, would be strong enough to resist membership pressure for
immediate gains and could concentrate instead on protecting the longrange interests of their members…. The agency shop will bring greater
stability to labor-management relations and will result in more
statesmanship on the part of union leaders who are free from the fear
of economic blackmail by their members and the possible destruction
of their unions.7
Early in 1977, discussion began anew in Albany on providing this protection and
accelerated after the Abood decision.

“Agency Shop Fee Collections to Start With D.C. 37 Units,” The Chief, August 26, 1977. The uniformed
services had much higher membership rates and accordingly derived less benefit from agency fees.
6 Since agency shop fees may not be used for political purposes such as Albany lobbying, the agency fee
should be fractionally less than member dues. In New York State, however, agency fee payers were charged
the full amount of member dues and, at the end of each year, had to apply for a refund of the “political”
portion of what they had paid. In practice, few did.
7 Frank Prial, “Union Security: Agency Shop,” The Chief, August 12, 1977.
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Meanwhile, however, Governor Hugh Carey put forward a far more ambitious
revision of the Taylor Law. “After ten years of experience,” Carey announced, “the time had
come to make changes in the law that guides governmental relations with its employees.”
Donald Wollett, Carey’s Employee Relations Director, criticized the “overregulated” nature
of public employee labor relations.8
Along with the agency fee (an approximation of the closed shop), Carey proposed
other modifications which would have made public employee collective bargaining more
akin to NLRA-NLRB private industry law. Employers would have been mandated to bargain
in good faith and penalties could be imposed on them by New York State’s Public Employee
Relations Board for improper practices. While strikes would have remained illegal,
injunctions and contempt proceedings against unions would have been barred except when
a strike threatened “substantial and irreparable injury to public health, safety or welfare.”
AFSCME District Council 37, New York’s largest municipal union, thought this meant police,
fire, hospitals and sewage treatment. Fines against individuals would be waived if the
courts found that employer action had “provoked” a work stoppage. Today, that may seem
unlikely, but in 1977, despite the Taylor Law penalties, workers often walked off their job
or engaged in slowdowns when management unilaterally changed the terms of work or
assigned work they deemed unsafe. DC37 reported two such incidents just that year. 9
Carey’s proposal to eliminate the “Triborough Doctrine,” would have made that type
of employer-initiated contractual change more likely. Since 1972, Triborough had barred
“Carey Proposes Nine Taylor Law Changes,” The Chief, March 25, 1977; Michael Rosenbaum, “Carey’s Plan to
Cut Taylor Law Curbs,” New York Post, March 15, 1977.
9 Norman Adler, “Plums and Poison,” Public Employee Press, March 25, 1977. Since 1974, unresolved police
and fire bargaining disputes had been subject to binding interest arbitration, so a mechanism – perhaps faulty
– existed to resolve ongoing disputes. For a full list of all Carey’s proposals, see “Carey Proposes Nine Taylor
Law Changes,” The Chief, March 25, 1977.
8

employers from unilaterally changing contract terms when a contract expired and
bargaining had reached an impasse.10 In a sense, Triborough had become part of a quid pro
quo: no precipitous action from either union or management. The necessity of bargaining
to agreement had been enforced on both parties. Now Carey suggested its elimination.
Initial union response was mixed to negative. Victor Gotbaum, head of DC 37,
complained that excellent proposals were coupled with “counterproductive” ones, but
cautiously hoped that negotiations might purge “the anti-labor aspects.” But the Civil
Service Employees Association, the largest state union, declared its “oppos[ition to] this bill
as a whole. The state-wide Teachers’ Association objected to Carey’s “carrot and stick
approach.” 11
Of course, Carey’s package did not wholly resemble its NLRA counterpart: there was
less carrot. Most notably, it left penalties on workers in place where a work stoppage was
union-initiated. Yet workers had struck repeatedly in the previous ten years despite this
provision, and those strikes had often “paid” for themselves. Our best comparative example
comes from a few years later. In 1980, New York’s transit workers struck; their municipal
counterparts did not. The latter signed contracts worth 16% over two years (at a time of
double-digit inflation) while transit workers won 22%.That extra money paid off the fines
in less than two years. 12 What kept the municipals on the sidelines was the fear of

New York State Public Employee law is administered and defined by the Public Employee Relations Board,
equivalent in many of its functions to the NLRB. DC37 and Local 1396, AFSME, AFL-CIO v. Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority was its ruling. 5 PERB ¶3037 (July 28, 1972), affirming, 5 PERB ¶ 4505 (1972).
Subsequently, in 1982, the ruling was incorporated into the Taylor Law statute. See, “The Triborough
Doctrine and Statute: A Catalyst or Hindrance to Harmonious Labor Relations?,”
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=82098, for a fuller discussion.
11 “Controversy Starts: Carey Proposes Nine Taylor Law Changes,” The Chief, March 25. 1977.
12 Marc Kagan, “An Early Challenge to the Age of Austerity and Inequality: Re-Examining New York City’s
Transit Strike From the Bottom-Up,” unpublished paper, 2015.
10

penalties levied against the union – fines and loss of check-off.13 Those would have been
substantially mitigated by Carey’s offer – which was, after all, the opening legislative
gambit from an employer, perhaps subject to negotiation that, as DC 37 Political Director
Norman Adler said, might have made the package “a more palatable offering for labor.”14
Moreover, the impact of Carey’s proposed stick was, oddly, less onerous, because, as
the legislative session ground on, Triborough’s beneficial effects for unions were
circumscribed by the NYS Court of Appeals. That spring, it ruled that “steps” and other
ongoing contractual provisions which automatically raised employer costs might be
eliminated by the employer after contract expiration. The value of Triborough to the unions
– and therefore the “cost” of its elimination – was now lessened.15
Ultimately, however, the unions decided to focus their efforts solely on winning the
agency shop. Carey’s package stalled; after a brief flurry of reportage in both the major
media and the union press, it was MIA. Only the agency shop fee and an authorization for
PERB to issue improper employer practice rulings became law.
What happened? Why did these proposals sink like a stone? It may be that the
unions were unsuccessful in moving Carey off his opening offer and that 2-for-1 remained a
sticking point. But more likely is that for most of the state and municipal unions,
Triborough, even in its newly limited form, was worth more than the right to strike. That’s
Those also weighed heavily on the leadership of TWU Local 100, which went on strike only because union
dissidents had temporarily seized control of the union’s Executive Board and rejected the 16% proposal. The
union lost its check-off for only 4 months after its leader, John Lawe, argued to PERB that he had tried to
prevent the strike. After its 2005 strike, the same union was fined $2.5 million and lost its check-off for
seventeen months.
14 Adler.
15 “The Triborough Doctrine and Statute: A Catalyst or Hindrance to Harmonious Labor Relations?,” Rather
than “trade in” this now more limited right, unions worked toward a legislative solution. In 1982, the
Triborough Doctrine became the “Triborough Amendment” to the Taylor Law. “Steps” were again shielded,
but the price the unions paid was a provision that if a union went on strike, it lost all of its Triborough
protections (along with the all the pre-existing Taylor Law strike penalties).
13

the opinion of Al Viani, one of Gotbaum’s top aides, about DC 37’s perspective. He
contrasted the strike power of transit or sanitation workers to create havoc with the far
more limited power of most DC 37 members – clericals, zookeepers, librarians, social
workers. The trade-off, he said, wasn’t worth it.16
Context matters too. Perhaps Gotbaum’s attitude would have been different in the
late 1960s, or even as late as 1971, when he sent his bridge tenders out on strike (leaving
the draw bridges open) to try to win pension changes. But in 1977, the municipals had
been through two years of brutal concessions. Viani was rightly proud of Triborough, which
had its genesis as his idea, an improper practice charge to PERB. Though in 1975 the City
had to ask its unions to defer a scheduled mid-contract raise, in 1976, Triborough meant
the City had to negotiate concessions and work rule changes, not just unilaterally
implement them. Perhaps 1977 wasn’t such a good time to get rid of such a life preserver.
What about today? Keeping Triborough and the severe penalties for work stoppages
has led to a situation in which expired contracts now stay in place for years at a time, and
where working with an expired contract has become a norm. In 2011, Governor Andrew
Cuomo won a three-year wage freeze and health benefit concessions from the two main
state public employee unions by threatening thousands of layoffs – that threat was his
“legal” way around Triborough protections. 17
In New York City, Mayor Bloomberg demanded a similar “pattern,” but did not wield
the layoff threat, perhaps believing the municipal unions might call his bluff. Under those
conditions, neither side had an incentive to bargain, and, increasingly, the term-limited
Author’s conversation with Al Viani, July 12, 2019.
Spear was right (see f. 3) that concessions were more dangerous to a leadership’s longevity than layoffs.
Workers angered about concessions ousted the leadership of the Public Employees Federation at the next
union election.
16
17

Mayor seemed to lose all interest in reaching agreements. When Bill de Blasio became
Mayor in January 2014, virtually every municipal contract was four or more years expired.
Although for political reasons he was eager to end this stalemate, the unions found their
bargaining position was weak. Their members had been working for years at the old rates,
belying the notion that raises were “necessary.” Even a few percent of lump sum
retroactive pay, would seem like a lot of money. de Blasio was a hero on the cheap.18
“A union which gives up the right to strike, said Stanley Aronowitz, “is no union.”19
Of course, New York State’s public employee unions did not technically give up the ability
to strike when they walked away from Hugh Carey’s offer in 1977, as was shown by the
1980 and 2005 transit strikes. Nor can we say for sure whether their members would have
better or worse off in the long run to give up Triborough.
Yet the rarity of public employee strikes in the years since indicates the impact of
the harsh penalties, and the impact of their disinclination in 1977 to remove some of them.
Moreover, the lethargy with which these unions now approach negotiations intensifies
their worst bureaucratic and top-down tendencies. If the “pattern” is all that can be
achieved, if the aspiration for more (or different) is so circumscribed by anti-strike law as
to be almost meaningless, then the inclination toward service unionism is intensified.
Today, for the first time in decades, one New York union representing public
employees – the New York State Nurses Association – is openly advocating for the abolition
of the no-strike provisions of the Taylor Law. Other unions are pondering the possibility

Contracts varied slightly, but most workers received 10-11% raises stretched out over a seven-year
contract term, with most of the years retroactive.
19 Chapter meeting, Professional Staff Congress, Graduate Center chapter, October 2015.
18

that the labor movement desperately needs more offensive weapons.20 Yet for similar
reasons as in 1977, most affected unions are ambivalent or even opposed, believing the
likely loss of Triborough would be ruinous to efforts to hold the line against concession
demands from employers. On a larger canvas, the balance of forces in this debate reflects
the general reluctance of the labor movement to take risks, rationalizing policies which
have led to the drip drip drip of slow decline.
We don’t know yet whether the glimmers of Chicago, West Virginia, Arizona, and
Los Angeles, are a false dawn or the real thing. If Democrats take power in Washington in
2021, and if the types of labor law reform that Senators Sanders and Warren are proposing
could be enacted, even in part – big ifs – unions and their members will face a momentous
choice. If all they really want is faster elections and stronger sanctions on employers, some
changes in the NLRA might actually make it easier to win recognition without really
rousing their potential members. They could coast to some uptick in numbers, and change
little. Alternatively, they could wake up – or be shaken from their slumber by pressure from
excited and impatient workers - and try to seize the opportunity. Then they would respond
to new rules by encouraging shop floor militancy, aggressively wielding the strike weapon,
building the solidarity necessary for secondary strikes, and trying to change the grievancebased culture of labor relations.
In the meantime, we can look to New York for some early signals. In 1977, the
negotiations that torpedoed Carey’s proposals, or similarly-framed alternatives, took place
behind closed doors. Labor unions and their members would be better off today if the

New York State Nurses Association, NYSNA 2018 Convention Approved Resolutions, “All Public Sector
Nurses, Along with Other Public Sector Employees, Should Have the Legal Right to Strike,”
https://www.nysna.org/sites/default/files/attach/435/2018/12/convention_approved_resolutions.pdf
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public employee labor movement had an open discussion, not just about the utility of
Triborough, but whether a union that has effectively given up its right to strike (or, in the
private sector, the inclination to do so), can ever be a bottom-up union, an organizing
union, a real union.

